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Abstract. An odd dissensus between confident metaphysicians and neo-pragmatist anti-
metaphysicians pervades early twenty-first century analytic philosophy. Each faction is
convinced their side has won the day, but both are mistaken about the philosophical
legacy of the twentieth century. More historical awareness is needed to overcome the
current dissensus. Lewis and his possible-world system are lionised by metaphysicians;
Quine’s pragmatist scruples about heavy-duty metaphysics inspire anti-metaphysicians.
But Lewis developed his system under the influence of his teacher Quine, inheriting
from him his empiricism, his physicalism, his meta-ontology, and, I will show in this
paper, also his Humeanism. Using published as well as never-before-seen unpublished
sources, I will make apparent that both heavy-duty metaphysicians and neo-pragmatist
anti-metaphysicians are wrong about the roles Quine and Lewis played in the develop-
ment of twentieth-century philosophy. The two are much more alike than is commonly
supposed, and Quine much more instrumental to the pedigree of current metaphysics.
1. Introduction: Quine and His Student Lewis from a Historical Point of
View
Metaphysical enquiry into the existence and nature of things, pronounced dead mid-
century by logical positivists, late Wittgensteinians, ordinary-language philosophers, and
pragmatists, took centre stage again at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of
the twenty-first century. Champions of metaphysics consider its victory complete, holding
up David Lewis (1941-2001) as their hero. His pluriverse of possible worlds, they say,
made metaphysics respectable once again. But anti-metaphysicians, inspired by W.V.
Quine’s (1908-2000) pragmatist scruples about heavy-duty metaphysics, proclaim with
equal confidence that metaphysics has no legitimacy. All of this is peculiar when we
consider the two philosophers’ personal and intellectual history. Quine was Lewis’s teacher,
and there was much common ground between them. Both were empiricists, physicalists,
Humeans, lovers of ontological desert landscapes who made efforts to explain away or
reduce abstruse posits naturalistically.
Increased historical awareness of twentieth-century developments would reveal the true
import of Quine’s and Lewis’s work, and so help overcome such pervasive misunderstand-
ings between metaphysicians and anti-metaphysicians. To bring about a historically self-
aware metaphysics we must extend the boundaries of the history of analytic philosophy to
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include the mid-to-late twentieth century. Analytic philosophy’s early beginnings, its revo-
lutionary overthrow of idealism and bold investigation of how language maps onto an exter-
nal world, have been subjected to close historical scrutiny. Now, in the twenty-first century,
we can investigate its development between 1945 and 2000 with the benefit of hindsight,
too. But an even more compelling reason to develop this new subfield, the recent history of
analytic philosophy, is because we twenty-first century philosophers need it to remove mis-
conceptions about our intellectual heritage. Quine in particular is a sadly misunderstood
figure, despite his stature. His intellectual relationship with his unabashedly metaphysical
disciple Lewis is an especially illustrative case in point. My overarching project is to set the
record straight about Quine’s role in metaphysics’ rumoured demise, and its improbable
rise from its ashes, between the mid- and late twentieth century. Quine, I argue, was not
an anti-metaphysician or flat-footed deflationist, but an interesting, empiricist metaphysi-
cian, striving to fit metaphysics around scientific discovery.1 In the service of that larger
project, this paper teases out one strain of unacknowledged Quinean influence on Lewis:
his Humeanism. modest, empirically-based
First I will briefly rehearse the case that Quine always was a metaphysician. Quine’s
views developed over time, but a preference for a modest, empirically-based kind of meta-
physics is a constant presence throughout his early, middle, and late periods. His empiri-
cism and pragmatism led him to deny the legitimacy of Aristotelian and a priori meta-
physics. These he viewed as ontologically extravagant, indefensible additions to the frugal
physicalism he favoured. Still, to embrace a frugal, physicalist ontology is to endorse a
metaphysical point of view. Secondly, I will present historical evidence, based on a combi-
nation of published works and never-before-seen unpublished papers and correspondence,
which suggests that Lewis’s Humean metaphysics derives, not from his reading Hume, but
most likely from Quine. Thirdly, I will show that Lewis’s mature, Humean counterpart
theory, too, has thoroughly Quinean underpinnings.
2. W.V. Quine: Empiricist Metaphysician
Anti-metaphysical pragmatists and inferentialists denounce metaphysical discourse as
empty. It derives, they say, from mistaking merely useful or conventional features of
our discourse for profound truth about reality. Some prominent anti-metaphysicians of
this stripe claim Quine as one of their own: ‘Quine, too, is really a deflationist about
ontological issues’ (Price 2009: 325). It is true that Quine viewed many of the darlings of
current metaphysics with deep suspicion. He refused to countenance possibilia, properties,
fictional characters, mathematical entities not quantified over in physics, and propositions.
It is also true that his opposition to such posits was motivated at least in part by his
pragmatist take on philosophy of science and epistemology. But Quine never endorsed the
neo-pragmatists’ view that metaphysics is no more than the result of a forced, artificial
separation between true and merely useful discourse. His pragmatism was epistemological,
not the kind which identifies usefulness with truth.
1See Janssen-Lauret 2015, Janssen-Lauret 2016, and MacBride and Janssen-Lauret 2015.
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The anti-metaphysical interpretation of Quine results from an ahistorical approach to
his work. When we, twenty-first century philosophers, read ‘On What There Is’ or ‘Two
Dogmas of Empiricism’, or perhaps ‘On Carnap’s Views on Ontology’ out of context, we
find individual lines which sound deflationist or anti-metaphysical. Read in this way, early
Quine is easily mistaken for an anti-metaphysical deflationist, but that does not mean that
he was one. The young Quine framed his work in these terms because his main interlocutor
at the time was his anti-metaphysical mentor Carnap. As a result, the papers are shot
through with vestigial Carnapian vocabulary. But that does not equal an endorsement
of Carnap’s anti-metaphysical views. On the contrary, Quine deploys the vocabulary in
order to deftly rebut such views. He sounds Carnapian when, for instance, he states that
metaphysical statements follow trivially from our conceptual schemes (1948: 29) and that
ontological questions are questions ‘not of fact but of choosing ... a convenient framework
for science’ (1951a: 72). But contra Carnap, whose principle of tolerance claims that dif-
ferent conceptual schemes are incommensurate, Quine maintains that schemes certainly
can be compared to each other ‘in point of real explanatory power’ (1948: 30). Ontologi-
cally profligate schemes positing properties or meanings are inferior, says Quine, because
they add entities without adding explanatory value (1948: 31). Apparently agreeing with
Carnap that ontology is a matter of framework choice, Quine immediately qualifies this
claim in a way which ultimately undermines it. He invokes his semantic holism to over-
throw Carnap’s distinction between scientific questions of fact and pragmatic questions of
framework choice, concluding ‘I agree [with Carnap] only if the same be conceded for every
scientific hypothesis’ (1951a: 72). According to Quine, ontology is continuous with science,
not separate from it. Scientific and ontological questions are equally answerable.
Historically ill-informed readings of Quine are so common because historical scholarship
on him, and on the mid-twentieth century generally, is only just beginning to emerge. Until
now only a small amount of historical work has been carried out on the general development
of analytic philosophy after the 1930s. Authors who touch upon Quine’s role within it
correctly credit him with making room for metaphysics after positivism, but generally
very briefly and without making a sustained case for a pro-metaphysical interpretation of
Quine (Simons 2013: 713-725, Williamson 2014: 12, Moore 2012: 318-323). Specifically
Quine-focused historical work is well-informed about the evolution of Quine’s thought,
including his metaphysics, but concentrates (with some exceptions, e.g. Hylton 2007)
almost exclusively on his early work from the 1940s and early ’50s (Ben-Menahem 2005,
Mancosu 2008, Frost-Arnold 2013), or on the young Quine’s relationship with Carnap
(Creath 1990). What is needed to rebut the anti-metaphysical interpretation of Quine and
come to a historically sound appreciation of recent developments in metaphysics, is detailed
historical work which shows continuity between the early Quine and Quine in his prime,
viewed in his historical context, the 1960s and ’70s. In this paper, I continue this work
(begun in Janssen-Lauret 2015). It is Quine’s mature works, including his magnum opus
Word and Object, that show him at work as a metaphysician, and in dialogue with great
philosophers other than Carnap, such as Barcan Marcus, Strawson, and later Davidson
and Lewis.
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Quine’s penchant for the metaphysical is apparent from his earliest publications. Wit-
ness, for instance, the title of his 1934 paper ‘Ontological Remarks on the Propositional
Calculus’, which takes issue with what he describes as the Fregean-Wittgensteinian assump-
tion that sentence letters stand for objects. His criterion of ontological commitment—‘to
be is to be the value of a variable’—usually dated to ‘On What There Is’, first appears in
print in the late ’30s (1939: 708). Why, then, is Quine so often misunderstood as anti-
metaphysical? One part of the story2 is that Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment
is often taken as a deflationist edict or a materialist call to arms, inviting us to formalise
physics and count its variables. That would be a significant and not unphilosophical task
for a philosopher of physics to undertake, but it is not a task imposed by Quinean onto-
logical commitment. Though naturalistically oriented, Quinean ontological commitment
is neither physicalist nor deflationist. It does not dictate any ontology. Quine’s criterion
is a meta-ontological tool, providing a strategy for determining what is assumed to exist
by candidates for an overall best theory. Rather than recommend some particular ontol-
ogy, it is designed to compare and adjudicate between rival theories (Janssen-Lauret 2016:
584-586). Quine aimed to put the existence claims of philosophy on an equal footing with
those of the natural sciences. Existence claims made in scientific theories are warranted
just in case they are indispensable to an overall best theory. A naturalistic philosopher,
who seeks a philosophy continuous with empirical and theoretical science, similarly has
good reason to believe in objects which are mentioned in the fullest, clearest statement
of her best theory. But the criterion of ontological commitment does not identify a single
best theory. It does not prescribe that it must be, or even include, physics.
Quine himself strove to maintain a physicalist ontology throughout his career, driven by
a longing for parsimony to an extent motivated by pragmatism. Yet his pragmatism did
not imply deflationism about truth or ontology. Quine’s stated reasons for his distrust of
abstracta are sometimes pragmatist, but never venture close to a Carnapian pragmatist
line according to which metaphysical questions are pseudoproblems, an artificial wedge
we drive between truth and utility. Even in the ’30s, when Quine was still deeply in
thrall to Carnap, he disavowed that line. ‘We are tempted at this point to dismiss the
whole issue between nominalism and realism as a metaphysical pseudoproblem. But in
thus cutting the Gordian knot we cut too deep’ (1939: 704). Instead he recommended
engaging in metaphysics of a kind tempered by empirical enquiry: ‘the ontological question
transcends linguistic convention: How economical an ontology can we achieve and still have
a language adequate to all purposes of science? In this form the question of the ontological
presuppositions of science survives.’ (1976 [1939]: 201).
Where the young Quine opposed some specific array of abstract posits—possibilia, propo-
sitions, attributes—he generally claimed to do so because to posit them would conflict with
his other metaphysical commitments. His argument against the posits of modal logic was
initially that they do not fit within a physicalist ontology: ‘the contemplated version of
quantified modal logic is committed to an ontology which repudiates material objects (such
2Another part of the story may be that Quine’s thesis of the inscrutability of reference is mistaken for
an expression of deflationism (Janssen-Lauret 2015: 154).
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as the Evening Star properly so-called) and leaves only multiplicities of distinct objects
(perhaps the Evening Star concept, the Morning Star concept, etc.) in their place’ (1947:
47). (Incidentally, Quine’s statement here is true of Carnap’s modal logic, but not of that
of his paper’s main target, Ruth Barcan. Barcan was an avowed nominalist who treated
her quantified modal logic as a syntactic calculus, not a possible-world system (Barcan
1947, Barcan Marcus 1978).)3 Against properties and propositions Quine adduced similar
objections, holding out hope for their dispensability to physical science: ‘nominalism can
be formulated thus: it is possible to set up a nominalistic language in which all of nat-
ural science can be expressed’ (1939: 708). Quine can be seen, then, to make negative
existential claims which are not pseudo-statements, but inferred from their incompatibility
with positive existential claims he asserts. In other words, he took himself, in demurring
from positing possibilia, propositions, and attributes, to be doing metaphysics—specifically,
ontology. So his distaste for abstract objects did not flow from, or imply, a global anti-
metaphysical view. It is also noteworthy that the later Quine began to assert the existence
of numbers under theoretical pressure from physics. A proper neo-pragmatist ought not
to answer a pseudo-question first with a tentative ‘no’, then with a firm ‘yes’. Negations
of pseudo-statements are also pseudo-statements, and just as unanswerable. Quine was
sceptical of some of the central posits and questions of ‘traditional metaphysics’ (1951a:
66)—God and God’s nature, universals and their natures, the soul and its nature—but
also repeatedly affirmed that his usage of ‘ontology’ accords with ‘some portion of philo-
sophical tradition’ (1951b: 13; see also 1951a: 66). Metaphysics a` la Quine is a modest, a
posteriori, frugal exercise in living within our means. Its posits are those which match our
best scientific theories. Still, a frugal, empiricist ontology is an ontology. To endorse one
is to take a metaphysical stance on what there is. Quine clearly took questions of what
categories of things exist—and how they are related to each other—to be legitimate and
answerable. He was also happy to admit empirically well-informed answers to some tra-
ditional metaphysical questions in areas other than ontology. He advocated, for instance,
a Humean account of causation (1974: 5-8), a four-dimensionalist account of time and
persistence (1960: 170-176), and a reductive account of mind and body (1960: 264-267).
Quine never endorsed a version of pragmatism which identifies usefulness with truth. His
pragmatism was, rather, epistemological, taking usefulness as a guide to truth. Pragmatism
is what leads us to decide to hold true one theory, along with its imputations of existence,
in preference to other theories because it has served us better than any other, and not led
us astray. The fact that the theory has served us well so far is a good, though fallible,
reason to believe that it has the best chance out of any theory we’ve so far entertained of
being true. As a result, its imputations of existence are the most likely to map onto the
real constituents of the world. According to Price, although Quine ‘take[s] for granted that
language has a well-defined core descriptive function ... given Quine’s own minimalism
about truth, it is no use his saying that descriptive discourse aims at truth’ (2009: 334).
But Price is wrong; Quine never subscribed to minimalism. He was perfectly within his
rights to say that science pursues, rather than decrees, truth (1990: 67). Quine embraced
3For further details, see Janssen-Lauret 2015: 158-161.
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Tarski’s disquotationalism about truth, but not the minimalist thesis that description can
be explained in purely disquotational terms, without appeal to worldly referents and sat-
isfaction. What he objected to in traditional theories of truth was their positing of senses
and propositions, not their reliance on values of variables which satisfy, or fail to satisfy,
the predicates ascribed to them. As Quine put it: ‘the general task which science sets itself
is that of specifying how reality ‘really’ is: the task of delineating the structure of reality
as distinct from the structure of one or another traditional language (except, of course,
when the science happens to be grammar itself). The notion of reality independent of lan-
guage is carried over by the scientist from his earliest impressions, but the facile reification
of linguistic features is avoided or minimised’ (Quine 1957: 5). Quine’s epistemological
pragmatism does not imply ontological deflationism. According to him usefulness is not
truth, but a reliable indicator of truth. Truth itself is a matter of correct representation of
an external world about whose nature and denizens we can fruitfully theorise. So neither
Quine specifically, nor pragmatists and empiricists generally, need deny the legitimacy of
metaphysics.
Certain things which go by the name of metaphysics are impossible to square with
Quinean empiricism and epistemological pragmatism. A prime example is a priori meta-
physics based on first philosophy. When Hylton, for example, contends that Quine is
opposed to traditional metaphysics (2007: 363), he takes for granted that traditional meta-
physics is a priori—though Hylton acknowledges that not all metaphysics is. Another is
the kind of metaphysics which explicitly defines itself as being outside the scope of sci-
ence, as in this characterisation by Rosen: ‘a metaphysical claim is a substantive claim
about some allegedly important aspect of reality that cannot be established or even sub-
stantially supported by the commonsensical and scientific methods we normally employ
for adjudicating controversial claims about the world around us’ (2013: 552-3). (Oddly,
Rosen nevertheless classifies Quine as a moderate metaphysician, given his firm views on
ontology, causation, physicalism and the like. Quine, of course, believes those views to be
substantially supported by scientific methods.) But there is no need to characterise meta-
physics as a priori or unsupported by science. According to Quine, metaphysics is just
enquiry into ontology and ideology. If that’s all Greek to you, a keen student of Quine’s
translated it into eight Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘what things there are and how they
are’. That student was, of course, the renowned metaphysician David Lewis (1999: 206).
3. Lewis’s Humeanism: The Influence of Quine
Lewis, intelligent and original philosopher though he was, did not spring fully formed
from the head of Zeus. His views were influenced by a variety of equally intelligent and
original philosophers he associated with. That Quine was a major, perhaps the major,
influence upon Lewis and his metaphysics is something of which contemporary philosophers
are insufficiently aware. In part this is due to the pervasive misconception that Quine was
anti-metaphysical. Another factor is an equally pervasive misconception among present-
day metaphysicians that Lewis was much more like them than he actually was. That
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second misconception, like the first, results from an ahistorical approach to twentieth-
century philosophy. Properly understood in his historical context, Lewis resembles Quine
much more closely.
Twenty-first century metaphysicians prophesy a new heyday of a priori, rationalist first
philosophy. While the natural sciences have their own empirical methods, and their own
physical subject matter, they say, philosophers employ non-empirical, a priori methods
to work out the structure of reality: what must be the case, what can be the case, and
what sorts of things can possibly co-exist. Such modal facts about the structure of real-
ity, metaphysical existence questions, and Aristotelian category questions are an entirely
different kind of beast from, indeed ‘nothing to do with’, empirical existence questions
(Tahko 2011: 28). Metaphysical results cannot be overthrown by any empirical results;
empirical science must operate within the confines of a priori philosophy. The resurgence
of metaphysics as first philosophy at this point in history is rather odd. A priori insight
into the nature of what must and can be the case was problematised not just by Quine,
but by Carnap, Wittgenstein, the Lvov-Warsaw School, and the Vienna Circle in the early
twentieth century drawing upon developments in mathematics—Cantorian set theory—and
physics—general relativity—which involved real scientific progress being made by overturn-
ing such accepted intuitive, a priori principles as ‘nothing is the same size as its proper
part’ and Euclid’s ‘parallel lines never meet’. It is also odd that one of the great heroes
of twenty-first century metaphysicians is Lewis, whose pluriverse of possible worlds they
frequently invoke. Lewis was concerned to account for the literal truth of our claims about
what can be the case and what must be the case by appealing to other, parallel, physical
universes, distinct space-times and their inhabitants (Lewis 1986a). Something is possible
if and only if it is the case in some such universe, and necessary if and only if it is the case
in all of them. Modern metaphysicians rely upon possible-world discourse to justify their
view that knowledge of possibility, necessity, and possible co-existence is not empirical,
but to be settled independently in the thought laboratory (Lowe 2006: 5-6). Lewis never
intended or approved of any such use of his modal philosophy.
Lewis’s pluriverse arose from reflection upon and remained indebted to the empiricist
system of his teacher Quine. Even the title of his magnum opus On the Plurality of Worlds
occurs—probably as a tongue-in-cheek reference to Giordano Bruno—in an early work by
Quine where he opposes the existence of a ‘plurality of worlds’ besides this one, some
of which contain Pegasus (1944: 160-161, translation in Carnielli, Janssen-Lauret, and
Pickering). Lewis, like Quine, was and always remained an empiricist, a physicalist, an
ontological minimalist, someone who viewed the methods and subject matter of philosophy
and the empirical sciences as continuous with each other, not as radically dissimilar.4
Central themes of Lewis’s work have been deeply misunderstood because they are forcibly
4My concern here is with the influence of Quine to be found in Lewis’s early writings in the ’60s and
’70s. In Lewis’s later phase, beginning in the ’80s, this influence appears watered down by Armstrong’s
persuading Lewis to countenance work for universals and to endorse the distinction between natural and
non-natural properties. Yet to a large extent, those influences remained intact even then, and in his later
works, especially ‘Ramseyan Humility’, Lewis returns to his Quinean roots, admitting naturalness does not
ward off ontological relativity. (See MacBride and Janssen-Lauret, in development).
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and incorrectly separated from their Quinean roots. Lewis’s pluriverse at first sight appears
ontologically profligate and anti-empiricist: how could we possibly know these objects exist
by empirical investigation? Upon closer inspection, it turns out that it is both an exercise
in Quinean ontology and bound by Quine’s empiricist strictures. Its first appearance is
as a translation of the possible-world talk Quine disparaged into Quine’s preferred first-
order ontological idiom (Lewis 1968). Positing the pluriverse is justified by appeal to its
theoretical fruitfulness, which Lewis, adhering to Quinean naturalism, took as a good reason
to hold it true (1986a: 4). In Lewis’s capable hands, possible worlds also furthered the
highly Quinean project of attempting to reduce or explain away naturalistically suspect
entities in physicalistically acceptable terms. Lewis scrupulously avoided the abstruse
posits beloved of first philosophers. Instead, he constructed propositions, minds, causes,
and, in his later period, sets all out of spatiotemporally extended possible universes which
are just like ours. Much more could be said about each of these. But for reasons of space,
my topic in this paper is Lewis’s Leitmotif of Humeanism. This too, I will show, has deep
Quinean roots.
Key to Lewis’s system is the doctrine that things are entirely loose and separate, that
there are no necessary connections between distinct objects. This doctrine goes by the
name of ‘Humeanism’, and was indeed maintained by David Hume. Perhaps because of
the name, it is easily assumed—if people reflect on the question at all—that Lewis came to
this doctrine by reading Hume. The assumption appears reasonable; after all, Lewis also
advocated a counterfactual theory of causation inspired by Hume’s remark, in section VII
of his Enquiry, that causation occurs where ‘if the first object had not been, the second
never had existed’ (quoted in Lewis 1973: 556). But neither Lewis’s publications nor his
Nachlass5 reveals any deep engagement with Hume elsewhere. Where Hume appears in
the index of Lewis’s collected papers, it is either in reference to that very same quotation
from the Enquiry (1986b: 159, 161, 216), or where Hume’s name comes up as a fairly
arbitrarily chosen example, e.g. in the invented case of a mad person who believes himself
to be Hume (1983: 141-154). Where his name occurs in On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis
either uses Hume as an example (of a space-time worm, 1986a: 210) or briefly ascribes
Humeanism to him without citing his work (1986a: 87, 91, 181). Nor does any perusal of
Lewis’s correspondence, unpublished work, and student papers yield evidence that Lewis
ever made a serious study of Hume beyond the undergraduate level.
A better hypothesis is that Lewis’s counterfactual theory of causation was indeed derived
from Hume, but his Humeanism developed independently, and came from Quine. Like all
other philosophers educated in the Western, empiricist tradition, Lewis read Hume as an
undergraduate, both at Swarthmore and as a visiting student at Oxford, in 1959-60. It
was around this time that the idea of a counterfactual theory of causation first took hold
5Lewis’s Nachlass of as yet unpublished papers, student work, and extensive correspondence spanning
about 40 years of his philosophical career, is held in the Firestone Library at Princeton University. As part
of the three-year AHRC project grant ‘The Age of Metaphysical Revolution: David Lewis and His Place
in the History of Analytic Philosophy’, I and my colleagues, Helen Beebee, Fraser MacBride, and Anthony
Fisher, have been granted permission by Stephanie Lewis, David Lewis’s widow and executrix, to publish
our selection of philosophically significant work from the Nachlass.
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in Lewis’s mind, as he declares in one of his later papers: ‘My second paper in my first
philosophy course defended a counterfactual analysis of causation. I’ve been at it, off and
on, ever since’ (Lewis 2004: 75). Lewis’s Nachlass contains two such papers, ‘On Causality
and Natural Laws’ and ‘Particular and General Causal Claims’, both dating from 1961,
and written at Swarthmore.6 As Lewis’s first publication on the topic quotes Hume, it is
quite possible that his undergraduate reading of Hume inspired the counterfactual theory.
But Hume’s doctrine that everything is loose and separate is not in evidence here. Among
the postgraduate papers preserved in Lewis’s Nachlass, there are none that concentrate
on Hume, or on other philosophers of a Humean turn of mind such as Ramsey. And
towards the end of his life, Lewis wrote to Galen Strawson—who denied that Hume was a
Humean—that he, Lewis, lacked the historical knowledge to come to an informed view on
Hume’s own position (Lewis to Strawson, 23 June 1997).7
A more plausible source of Lewis’s Humeanism is Quine, Lewis’s PhD supervisor, whose
course on Word and Object he attended at Harvard in 1963 (letter to Ruth Barcan Marcus,
19 April 1996), and whom he first approached in writing in the academic year 1964-5 with
a thesis proposal on ‘the tacit conventions of language’ (Lewis to Quine, 9 February 1965).
Lewis’s proposal found favour with Quine, who agreed to supervise the thesis (Quine to
Lewis, 10 February 1965). By contrast to Lewis, Quine had a solid grounding in Hume
that went well beyond undergraduate perusal. He gave a lecture course on Hume at Har-
vard in the mid-1940s, whose content was of such interest that it was recently published
(Quine 2003 [1946]), and has been the subject of several scholarly papers (Pakaluk 1989,
Buickerood 2004). A noteworthy passage in it prefigures a sort of counterfactual theory
of causation, even though Lewis’s version pre-dates his association with Quine. Quine’s
passage notes that ‘causation and prediction can be separated’ with causation being an
ontic necessary connection, and prediction based on constant conjunction (Pakaluk 1989:
448 n. 18). A lecture course produced some eighteen years before Quine and Lewis met
might have been completely forgotten by the ’60s. But Quine’s published papers from
the period surrounding his supervision of Lewis’s thesis regularly show detailed engage-
ment with Hume, mentioning him, for instance, while arguing against a first-philosophical
justification of induction in ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ (p. 72; also see Ra¨ıd 2003).
Most tellingly, there is Quine’s semi-popular paper ‘Necessary Truth’, dating from 1963,
the year Lewis first came across him. In this paper, Quine defended at length Hume’s
dictum ‘there are no necessary connections of matters of fact’ (1976 [1963]: 71), that is,
Humeanism. Quine took Hume’s dictum to be expressing the thesis that there is no more
to alleged necessary connections than generality or regularity. The adverb ‘necessarily’ is
properly applied not to atomic sentences, but to conditionals linking descriptions of events:
‘the point is, in all cases, to seek the necessity not in the separate matters of fact but
in the connections between them’ (1976 [1963]: 70). Subjunctive conditionals apparently
dealing with dispositions and the like form apparent counter-examples to Quine’s regularity
analysis. ‘Soluble’ does not merely mean ‘dissolves if put in water’—that open formula is
6Thanks to Anthony Fisher for drawing my attention to this passage and the relevant student papers.
7Thanks to Helen Beebee for drawing my attention to the letter to G. Strawson.
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vacuously satisfied by a lump of stone which always remains dry. According to Quine, such
apparently problematic subjunctive conditionals can be analysed away. ‘Soluble’ really
includes a covert reference to the chemical properties of the substance in question, a correct
description of which accounts in non-subjunctive terms for its dissolving whenever it comes
into contact with water. Quine’s formulation of Hume’s dictum involving ‘matters of fact’
is significant, because it means his position is not vulnerable to objections to Humeanism
which quibble over what ‘distinct existences’ are. In one central respect, Quine’s version
of Humeanism is more radical than Hume’s. Hume distinguished matters of fact from
relations of ideas, that is, logic and mathematics. According to him the only true necessity
is logico-mathematical necessity. Quine saw no sharp distinction between the empirical,
theoretical science, mathematics, and logic. So he concluded that all kinds of necessity,
including the logical, are subspecies of natural necessity. All are in the final analysis no
more than regularity (1976 [1963]: 74-76).
Quine’s way of spelling out Hume’s dictum is not identical to that of Lewis, whose
formulations of Humeanism usually relied on possible worlds: ‘we look to the Humean
denial of necessary connections between distinct existences ... patching together parts of
different possible worlds yields another possible world ... the principle is that anything can
coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions’
(Lewis 1986a: 87-88; see also Lewis 2009: 208-209). Even though Quine’s Humeanism and
Lewis’s are not identical, circumstantial evidence from both published and unpublished
sources suggests that the idea of Humeanism came to Lewis via Quine, rather than Hume.
Ramsey may have been a more minor influence on Lewis’s mature Humeanism, as evinced
by, for instance, Lewis’s discussion of Ramsey’s Humean views on natural laws (Lewis 1973:
73-74). But the lion’s share of the evidence points to Quine as its principal source. Quine,
unlike Lewis, was well-versed in Hume’s thought and was, just around the time he and
Lewis met, developing a version of Hume’s dictum consonant with his own philosophical
commitments. This likely inspired Lewis to develop a version suited to his own system
years later.
4. The Quinean Roots of Lewis’s Humean Counterpart Theory
Although in the quotation above, Lewis’s Humeanism is expressed in terms of separating
and rearranging the components of possible worlds, that way of putting things is metaphor-
ical. Lewis did not believe that the same thing could appear in two distinct possible worlds.
His official line on Humeanism deploys his counterpart theory. (In particular, it makes use
of duplicates, a special case of counterparts (1986a: 87-89).) Lewis’s counterpart theory
is another component of his system which grew organically out of his interactions with
Quine. It clearly bears the stamp of interaction with his former teacher. It is also another
corrective to the misconception that Lewis was more like contemporary metaphysicians
than like Quine. Lewis’s mature counterpart theory, which takes modal judgements and
essentialist predications to be inconstant and context-dependent, echoes Quine’s mature
view that we can make sense of essentialist discourse in terms of holding certain parts of a
description fixed.
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Evidence from the Nachlass reveals that Lewis began to believe in his possible worlds
less than a year before 1 October 1968, when he wrote to Quine, ‘up to about a year
ago, I took for granted that possible worlds were entia non grata unless reduced to state
descriptions, maximal consistent sets of sentences, or the like’ (Lewis to Quine, 1 October
1968). He attributes his change of heart partly to the thought that possible worlds and
sets are equally problematic posits, and partly to ‘the counterpart paper, which I take
to remove the difficulties about inter-world identity’ (Lewis to Quine, 1 October 1968).
The paper in question (Lewis 1968) began as an attempt to show that possible worlds
could be fitted into a Quinean meta-ontology. Early Quine had not only dismissed modal
ontology as anti-physicalist, but written off the very idea of a possibile as incoherent.
Though not wholly dismissive of Barcan’s (1947) syntactic treatment, during that period
he categorically opposed interpreted modal logics, arguing that their characteristic posits,
whether concepts or possibilia, suffered from a lack of clear criteria of identity (1948: 23).
The problem is only exacerbated by Kripke semantics, with their proliferation of domains
of discourse, intended to model possible worlds. A Kripke-style interpretation brings with
it two kinds of quantifier, the pair ‘’ and ‘♦’ and the pair ‘∃’ and ‘∀’. The latter perform
the function they perform in non-modal first-order theories, but the former range over
possible worlds. Each world forms a domain of discourse for ‘∃’ and ‘∀’ to range over,
its elements interpreted as objects contained within the worlds. By Quine’s standards,
this makes a mystery of how to translate modal theories into his canonical language of
regimentation, and of the interpretation of trans-world identity statements. If there is no
single unified domain of quantification, but multiple ones existing side by side, there is no
obvious answer to the question whether an object in some world is identical to an object
in another—the question Lewis, in his letter, refers to as ‘inter-world identity’.
Counterpart theory provides principled answers both to the question of regimentation
and to that of trans-world identity. Lewis translated away the appearance of a hierarchical
ontology of worlds whose contents are only locally quantified over by letting ordinary first-
order quantifiers range over worlds as well as their contents, that is, their parts. The
scope of our quantifiers is much wider than we normally assume, encompassing all of the
modal pluriverse, but it is ordinary first-order quantification all the same. On his reading,
it follows that two things located in distinct possible worlds are never identical, since
they occupy different locations in the pluriverse. When we speak counterfactually of an
individual, talking about what she might have been or done, we make covert reference to
her counterparts, the individuals most similar to her in alternative possible worlds. Worlds
and possibilia, though existing in distinct space-times, are simply physical objects with
clear criteria of identity.
After 1968 Quine ceased to complain about the unintelligibility of possible worlds (Quine
1968). He admitted certain senses of ‘possible world’, like ‘cosmic distribution of particles’
as physicalistically kosher, though he continued to worry that ‘this idea affords us no
general way of equating sentences in real life’ (1970: 4). While Lewis inherited a large
amount of his philosophical presuppositions from Quine, in this case we see the student
influencing the teacher’s views. Quine, initially strongly anti-modal, gradually softened
his stance on modal logic under the influence of Barcan Marcus during the ’50s and ’60s.
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He grudgingly admired Barcan’s quantified modal logic, not interpreted in possible-world
terms, and entirely free from use-mention confusions or anti-nominalistic posits, and she
persuaded him that several of his anti-modal arguments were misguided (Janssen-Lauret
2015: 161). Yet until the late ’60s, Quine still fervently maintained that there was no
sense to be made of modal ontology, which Barcan Marcus, an inveterate nominalist, did
not believe in (Janssen-Lauret 2015: 158-159). When we see Quine softening his stance on
modal ontology specifically, from the year of Lewis’s rebuttal onwards, the influence must
have come from Lewis.
Still, Quine was nowise moved to countenance any modal ontology. He held on tightly to
his extensionalism for the rest of his days, and was not much impressed with counterpart
theory. ‘What I object to in [intensions] is the use of possible worlds. And what I mainly
object to in possible worlds is the counterpart relation’ (letter to Lewis, 1 August 1974).
His stated reason in that letter is that his three grades of modal involvement still apply.
But several of the moves he made in ‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement’ (1976 [1953])—
like the number of the planets argument, and the argument that modal logic implies an
invidious Aristotelian essentialism—are among those made obsolete by Barcan Marcus’
arguments. Yet part of Quine’s anti-essentialist argument not only survived unscathed,
but was gradually embraced, over the course of the ’70s, by Lewis, who eventually settled
on a profoundly anti-essentialist counterpart theory.
Quine opposed the third grade of modal involvement, quantification into modal con-
texts, because of its purported connection with what he called ‘Aristotelian essentialism’.
Quantified modal logic, Quine argued, forces us to divide an object’s properties into the
essential and the accidental, independently of either the context in which the question is
raised or the object’s theoretical role (Quine 1976 [1953]: 175-176). But no such division
can sensibly be made, so we should abjure modal logic. Barcan Marcus was quick to point
out that modal logic forces no such division upon us (Barcan Marcus 1967). What is strik-
ing from a twenty-first century point of view is that she does not contest Quine’s main
anti-essentialist claim, that a description-independent division of an object’s properties
into the essential and the accidental is senseless.
Modern metaphysicians are convinced that Quine’s anti-essentialist arguments are ob-
viously mistaken, and that their side has won the day. Nowadays the thesis that we can
know an object’s essential properties context-independently is known simply as ‘essential-
ism’, and so widely accepted among metaphysicians that it is frequently asserted without
much argument. Laurie Paul, for example, writes, ‘What objects are is determined by their
modal properties, and these are determined in a context independent manner’ (Paul 2006:
345). Brian Ellis writes that true essentialist claims ‘are such that the thing to which refer-
ence is made, whether by name or by gesture, could not fail to have the property ascribed
to it while still being the individual it is’ (2001: 11). And Penelope Mackie writes, ‘It is
natural to think that it is a necessary condition for anything to be counted as a variety
of essentialism that it conform to the principle that the status of an object’s properties as
essential or accidental to it is independent of the way in which the object is described or
referred to’ (2006: 3). Again, their attitude is ahistorical, especially so if they assume that
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Lewis was one of them in this regard. Although Mackie notes that Lewis was not, she nev-
ertheless dismisses his view without argument and endorses the description-independence
principle instead. But she and her fellow essentialists are wrong to do so.
Ahistorical attitudes which lead metaphysicians to write off Quine’s view that modal
attributions are context-dependent, and embrace essentialism instead, instil in those meta-
physicians a false sense of security. A better sense of the history of twentieth-century
philosophy reveals that their side never won the day. Quine’s main anti-essentialist argu-
ment remains in force. Lewis’s counterpart theory evolved to account for it, resulting in the
doctrine of modal inconstancy (1986: 254). By the time Quine expressed his distaste for
‘the’ counterpart relation, implying that the relation is unique, Lewis had already admitted
that the problem of personal identity forced him to ‘revise my counterpart theory by pro-
viding for a multiplicity of counterpart relations’ (1971: 203).8 Lewis must have assumed
a unique counterpart relation in 1968; not only did he speak consistently of ‘the’ counter-
part relation in that paper, but he could hardly have considered the 1971 introduction of
a multiplicity of counterpart relations a revision if he had assumed a multiplicity before.
Later versions of his counterpart theory are increasingly closely modelled on Quine’s view
that all modal attributions are context-dependent, arriving eventually at an explicit en-
dorsement of full modal inconstancy. To see why, we must chart the evolution of Quine’s
anti-essentialist arguments.
The young Quine had thought of modal judgements as inextricably mired in analytic-
ity. ‘The result of prefixing “” to any statement is true if and only if the statement is
analytic’ (1947: 45). Early versions of his anti-essentialist arguments consequently present
statements of the form ‘x is essentially F ’ as having an underlying form which attributes
analyticity to sentences ascribing F -ness to x. Even if we grant that ‘rationality is involved
in the meaning of the word “man” while two-leggedness is not; but two-leggedness may at
the same time be viewed as involved in the meaning of “biped” while rationality is not’,
Quine complained, the essentialist judgement cannot stand in isolation from such claims
of analyticity: ‘it makes no sense to say of the actual individual, who is at once a man
and a biped, that his rationality is essential’ (1951c: 22). But the mathematical cyclist
argument is not given up after Quine ceases to describe modality as reducible to analyt-
icity (Quine 1960: 199). The kernel of the argument is that essence only makes sense in
context. Its ‘Two Dogmas’ incarnation stresses the negative claim that by just referring
to the individual, without foregrounding certain salient properties, essentialist claims are
difficult to make sense of. Later versions of the argument place increasing stress on the
positive proposal that, given a description of an object, it is possible to hold fixed some of
the predicates comprising that description, as though they were immutable, and let others
vary. ‘Certain properties of a thing or substance are under investigation, against a back-
ground of others that are not being questioned. The utility of this contrast, dependent
again on the project of the moment, has doubtless nurtured the age-old belief in an eternal
distinction between essence and accident. I part company with the essentialists and the
8For further details, see Beebee and MacBride 2015.
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modal logicians only when they accord these modes a place in the austere and enduring
description of reality’ (1986: 94).
Lewis’s doctrine of modal inconstancy similarly makes essential and accidental predi-
cations relative to context. It is not just that there is no unique counterpart relation,
because who or what is most similar to some actual individual in some alternative possible
world is a vague matter; who your counterparts are also depends on the context in which
the modal question is raised. Asking in isolation whether, for instance, Hillary Clinton
could have been a man, or a black woman born to different parents, or a woman born to
different parents in the nineteenth century, is just baﬄing. But raised in the context of
a discussion on whether Clinton’s career would have progressed more smoothly had she
been male, or have faced even greater obstacles had she been black, or how she might
have responded to the even more sexist nineteenth century, these questions make perfect
sense (1986: 252). According to Lewis’s account, the first question selects for male coun-
terparts, the second for black female counterparts, and the third for nineteenth-century
female counterparts. Essentialist accounts will generally have trouble accounting for all
three of the above. Those which rely on the essentiality of origin, where Clinton’s essence
is to come from one particular pair of gametes produced by her exact biological parents,
would struggle to make sense of any. And yet this kind of counterfactual scenario is very
common in moral and political discourse. Lewis saw this, and neatly accommodated it by
means of the huge modal ontology he was already committed to. According to Quine’s
Humean version of events, though, no modal ontology is necessary. All we need is our cur-
rent theory, including its conditionals expressing natural regularities. We choose certain
parts of its descriptions of the world and its inhabitants to hold fixed (for instance, those
to do with the history, culture, and politics of the US, and the character, intelligence, and
political interests of Hillary Clinton) and let others vary (for instance, Clinton’s gender or
ethnicity). We derive the consequences of this alternative, counterfactual theory. Against
the scientific essentialists (like Ellis, quoted above) who hold that science must deal with
essences, Quine counters that while science does contain a ‘respectable vestige of essen-
tialism [which] consists in picking out those minimum distinctive traits of a chemical, or
a species, or whatever, that link it most directly to the central laws of the science’ such
characterisations are neither a priori nor analytic, but ‘of a piece rather with the chemical
or biological theory itself’ (1976 [1972]: 52).
5. Conclusion
Aristotelian and a priori metaphysics, after being thrown into doubt by previous gen-
erations, has made a surprise come-back in recent years. Even more surprising is the
content of the doctrines most contemporary metaphysicians consider uncontroversial: that
the modal structure of the world, including what kinds of things could possibly co-exist, is
fixed, knowable a priori, and completely separate from empirical enquiry, and that essen-
tialism is both true and known pre-theoretically, a priori. At the same time metaphysics
also has its vocal detractors, who doubt whether metaphysics of any sort is at all coherent.
The current dissensus is due to our collective amnesia about our recent history. Sound
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historical work on the mid- to late twentieth century is needed break through this im-
passe. Historical investigation makes clear that the popular tale according to which Lewis
is the champion of the new metaphysics, Quine its neo-pragmatist enemy, cannot stand.
Lewis’s system grew out of the application of the guiding principles of the empiricism of his
teacher Quine. Both teacher and student were empiricist metaphysicians, finding a role for
philosophical enquiry about the existence and nature of things in its interdependence with
the deliverances of the sciences. In particular, this applies to the cornerstone of Lewis’s
system, his Humeanism. This doctrine did not result from Lewis’s reading of Hume, but
from Quine, who defends it in a paper dated around the time he first met Lewis. Lewis’s
mature Humean counterpart theory is also Quinean in inspiration, a modal realist version
of Quine’s view that essence makes sense only in context. According to Quine we may hold
fixed certain parts of the description of an object, counting them as essential for present
purposes, letting others vary freely. Lewis takes over the view that essential attribution
is context-dependent, explaining this in terms of different contexts selecting for different
ranges of salient counterparts.
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